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The U.S. Department of Defense policy on NATO standardization re-
quires all major defense procurement be reviewed for standardization
with NATO and whenever possible codevelopment/coproduction programs be
initiated with NATO nations. Presently, U.S. procurement regulations
dominate these joint efforts. However, existing international programs
have experienced an increasing reluctance on the part of participating
NATO nations to accept U.S. procurement regulations. Instead, these
nations desire to apply their own procurement regulations to their
domestic industries.
This study identifies the problems experienced by the acquisition
manager and U.S. industry on multinational programs resulting from the
use of foreign procurement regulations and examines their implications
for the Department of Defense's future acquisition policy. The study
concludes that when the United States is the contracting nation, U.S.
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The policy of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
(RSI) has acquired a greater importance due to the instability in the
Persian Gulf, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the present situation
in Poland (1981), and the sustained arms build-up by the Warsaw Pact
countries. To further this policy, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Executive Branch are placing increased emphasis on transatlantic
armaments collaboration and initiatives designed to better coordinate with
other NATO allies the use of research and development resources and pro-
vide greater interoperability and standardization of weapon systems and
equipment. As a result of these various programs, the acquisition
manager is experiencing a greater involvement in the international con-
tracting environment and facing many new challenges.
One of these challenges has been the melding into a business relation-
ship the acquisition regulations for each country involved in a trans-
atlantic cooperative program. Although difficult, it has been possible
primarily as a result of U.S. procurement regulations dominating any
U.S. sponsored transatlantic cooperative program. However, over the
past several years NATO nations have, to various degrees, begun pressur-
ing the U.S. to utilize the procurement regulations of the country where
the contractor is located. Unless U.S. procurement officials fully
understand the problems and implications of concessions in this direc-
tion, the U.S. may find itself in an untenable position in the years to

come. Once changes in the U.S. procurement system are made to accommo-
date foreign procurement regulations, they cannot be easily reversed.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study were to identify the problems encoun-
tered in the use of foreign procurement regulations in the international
contracting process and to examine the implications for future Depart-
ment of Defense acquisition policy.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the above stated objectives, the following research question
was posed in this study:
What are the problems and implications for the Department of Defense
in contracting with the industries of NATO nations for U.S. defense mater-
ial in accordance with foreign procurement regulations as opposed to U.S.
procurement regulations?
The following subsidiary questions were developed in order to address
this research question:
1. How has DOD become involved in the use of foreign procurement
regulations in international contracting?
2. What is current DOD policy on the use of foreign procurement
regulations in international contracting?
3. What U.S. /foreign procurement regulation differences present
the greatest problems in the use of foreign procurement
regulations in international contracting?
4. What has been the experience of DOD acquisition personnel in




5. How would an agreement by DOD to contract under the foreign
procurement regulations of one NATO nation affect procurement
agreements with other NATO nations?
D. SCOPE
The scope of this research is limited to a case study of the use of
foreign procurement regulations in the codevelopment/coproduction of the
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system involving the United States,
Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark. The research is intended to
identify the principal problems from the use of foreign procurement regu-
lations which impact on the acquisition manager and U.S. industry and
from these problems examine the implications for the Department of De-
fense's future acquisition policy.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this study, it is assumed the reader is familiar with
standard Department of Defense contracting terminology, procedures and
concepts, with the DOD program management structure and operations, and
possesses a general knowledge of NATO rationalization, standardization,
and interoperability policy.
F. METHODOLOGY
The research methodology used in this study consisted primarily of a
comprehensive review of the literature base and the use of personal and
telephone interviews with government and industry acquisition personnel
involved in the international contracting process. The literature base
was collected through the Naval Postgraduate School library, the Defense

Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) > and the Defense Systems
Management College (DSMC) . Telephone and personal interviews were held
with program managers, business/financial managers, contracts personnel,
other government officials attached to the Office of the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition Policy), Chief of Naval Material, Naval Sea Sys-
tems Command, Naval Plant Representative Office, General Dynamics, Roll-
ing Airframe Missile Program Office, Explosion Resistant Multi-Influence
Sweep System Program Office, and with contractor personnel at General
Dynamics Corporation.
Additional data presented in this study was obtained from an examina-
tion of regulations, directives, instructions, guidelines, acquisition
plans, contracts, and other applicable program office and contracting
office files and records.
G. ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II gives a historical
perspective to provide a background of the current international acquisi-
tion arena. Chapter III provides an overview of the acquisition manager's
international contracting environment and major considerations. Chapter
IV identifies the problems currently experienced with the use of foreign
procurement regulations in international contracting and examines their
implications for DOD. Chapter V illustrates how some of these problems
have been dealt with on a specific program. Finally, Chapter VI inte-






A. DOD RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND INTEROPERABILITY (RSI) POLICY
DEVELOPMENT
After World War II, the United States furnished more than $21 billion
in military assistance to the European NATO nations during a period of
thirty years. This military assistance not only allowed these nations to
begin rebuilding their industrial base but ensured a partial standardiza-
tion of NATO armaments through proliferation of U.S. weapons and equipment.
As these European nations made progress with their task of rebuilding and
became less dependent on the United States for direct military assistance,
this partial standardization of NATO armaments continued through the
market created by the European dependency on U.S. weapons and equipment
[1:269].
As the economic prosperity of the European allies increased, U.S.
foreign policy shifted in the 1960's away from military assistance to trade,
The European nations were expected to become more self-reliant by re-
developing their own defense industries. To accomplish this, it was essen-
tial they enter into bilateral and multilateral arrangements given their
small national markets and the high cost of developing and fielding new
technology. This led the European nations to develop the transnational
corporation, redevelop their technology base, and search out third world
markets. The European industrial base became strong enough by the 1970'
s




While commendable, this rematuration of the European industrial base
created political, economic, and military problems for the United States.
Militarily, the recovery and technological advancement of the European
industrial base led to the replacement of U.S. -built weapons and equip-
ment with European-built equipment, thus contributing to a destandardiza-
tion of NATO armaments. Logistical, doctrinal, and other related prob-
lems which normally would have lain dormant surfaced, creating a threat
to the survivability of U.S. troops in Europe [2:1-4],
Economically, the advancement and recovery of the European industrial
base has presented a challenge to the United States in third world mar-
kets which previously were the sole domain of the U.S. Europe has always
been an export oriented economy due to lack of the necessary domestic
demand required to realize economies of scale. Therefore, it was only
natural Europe should look to third world markets to restore itself to
the economic position occupied before World War II. In the 1970' s this
brought about a decline in the monopolistic control of the U.S. arms in-
dustry over the military hardware market. Thus the economic stability of
the United States was being challenged. Further evidence of this fact was
the devaluation of the dollar, the growth and size of European multi-
nationals and emphasis on the astute use of resources in Europe [2:1-4].
Politically, the European recovery presented the United States with a
European industrial base organized along national and transnational lines
and now fully capable of refusing to fall in line with U.S. policy. Thus,
the NATO alliance was no longer soft and pliable to the pressures of its
North American allies. In total, the United States was being challenged
militarily, economically, and politically by its own allies. [2:1-4].
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The military challenge was recognized by the United States in the
1950's and 60's, but not until the 1970's did the full economic and poli-
tical impact become clear. By the 1970's the European allies were no long-
er asking for a share of the military hardware market but demanding it.
If they were not given this share, European markets would be shut off
to the United States and Europe would develop its own defense industrial
base and technology in such a way as to be destructively competitive with
the U.S. This European initiative was made clear in testimony before the
Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and
Readiness by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on NATO Affairs,
Ambassador Komer. He stated: [3:17]
I think we are kidding ourselves if we think Europe will keep buying
as much from us if we don't buy more from them. The handwriting is
on the wall as far as this problem is concerned.
The British, the Germans, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the Cana-
dians, and the Dutch have put us very clearly on notice. . .either
we're going to give the allies a somewhat bigger share of our
market or they're increasingly going to go for their own equipment,
even if ours is better and cheaper. It's as simple as that because
we do the same thing.
Therefore, it was the economic and political challenge as much if not
more than the military challenge which spurred the United States to take
action.
The United States needed to develop a policy which would not require
the European allies to sacrifice their new industrial or technological
capability, yet would halt the trend toward armament destandardization,
recognize the full partnership of the European allies, and protect the
U.S. defense industrial base. Since the European allies are heavily de-
pendent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and willingness to protect Europe,
and any effort that contributed to the military effectiveness of the
13

alliance would receive support of all members, that policy became
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI). That the
policy would receive full support was especially true in light of the
concern over the large build-up of conventional forces by the Warsaw
Pact nations. To preserve the industrial and technological capability
of the European allies and protect the U.S. defense industrial base, the
policy calls for a closer U.S. /European cooperative effort in the design,
development, and production of weapon systems, hence, a "two-way" street
of technology and technical know-how. This concept is essential to the
policy as an incentive for European cooperation. The "two-way" street
is actually: [2:5]
an attempt to establish a long-term military, economic and political
relationship with Europe that does not encourage them to slowly but
summarily shut off their markets to us.
Therefore, NATO RSI can actually be viewed as a national policy, military
in thrust but equally as important economically and politically [2:5-6].
CongTess expressed its views on NATO RSI policy through Public Law
94-361, Sections 802 and 803, of 14 July 1976, which is commonly re-
ferred to as the Culver-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Appro-
priation Authorization Act of 1977. This legislation is the charter for
NATO RSI policy and regarded as the most authoritative statement of
policy on standardization and interoperability of any NATO ally. The
amendment states: [3:10]
It is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for
the use of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in
Europe.
.
.should be standardized or at least interoperable with
equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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To implement this policy the Amendment requires that: [3:10]
The Secretary of Defense shall to the maximum feasible extent
initiate and carry out procurement procedures that provide for
the acquisition of equipment which is standardized and interoperable.
The Culver-Nunn Amendment also authorized the waiver of the "Buy-
American" Act by the Secretary of Defense when required to procure
standardized or interoperable equipment in the best interest of the na-
tional defense.
President Carter placed executive branch emphasis on NATO RSI policy
when he stated: [4:6]
As we strengthen our forces, we should also improve cooperation in de-
velopment, production and procurement of Alliance defense equipment.
The Alliance should not be weakened militarily by waste and over-
lapping. Nor should it be weakened politically by disputes over
where to buy defense equipment. . .we must make a major effort... to
eliminate waste and duplication between national programs; to pro-
vide each of our countries an opportunity to develop, produce and
sell competitive defense equipment; and to maintain technological
excellence in allied combat forces.
DOD promulgated Directive 2010.6 on RSI policy in March 1977 based on
the above congressional legislation and executive branch guidance. The
current revision of the directive issued in March 1980 has essentially
the same policy guidance as that issued in 1977. The directive states,
in part, that: [5:1-2]
It is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for
U.S. forces employed in Europe under the terms of the North At-
lantic Treaty should be standardized or at least interoperable with
equipment of other members of NATO.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense shall initiate and carry out
methods of cooperation with its allies in defense equipment ac-
quisition to improve NATO's military effectiveness and to provide
equitable economic and industrial opportunities for all participants.
The Department of Defense will also seek greater compatability
of doctrine and tactics to provide a better basis for arriving
at common NATO requirements.
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The goal is to achieve standardization of entire systems, where
feasible, and to gain the maximum degree of interoperability
throughout Alliance military forces.
The directive also clarifies the terms of "rationalization,"
"standardization" and "interoperability." It offers the following
definitions: [5:1-4]
Rationalization . Any action that increases the effectiveness
of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of
defense resources committed to the Alliance. Rationalization
includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to
higher Alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual
support, improved interoperability, or greater cooperation.
Rationalization applies to both weapons/material resources and
non-weapon military matters.
Standardization . The process by which member nations of NATO
achieve the closest practicable cooperation among forces, the
most efficient use of research, development and production re-
sources, and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use
of: (a) Common or compatible operational, administrative, and
logistic procedures; (b) Common or compatible technical procedures
and criteria; (c) Common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies,
components, weapons, or equipment; and (d) Common or compatible
tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatability.
Interoperability . The ability of systems, units, or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units,
or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable- them to
operate effectively together.
DOD has also included RSI policy guidance in its directives on major
weapons system acquisition. The current revision of 19 March 1980 to
DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 provides: [6:4]
NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI)
shall be basic considerations in acquisition of systems having a
partial or total application to Europe.
DOD components shall take action in the following areas: [7:18-19]
Consider NATO country participation throughout the acquisition
process. This includes standardization and interoperability with
other NATO weapon systems.
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Consider NATO doctrine and NATO member threat assessments. In
development of MENS, mission needs of NATO members shall be
considered.
Solicit NATO member contractors for bids and proposals on U.S.
systems and components when such an opportunity is not precluded
by statute or by the national disclosure policy.
In addition, DOD Directive 5000.2 lists factors to be considered dur-
ing evaluation of alternative system concepts.
DOD has continued to emphasize and support NATO RSI. The greatest
concern now, as in the 1970 's, is that the U.S. can no longer match the
output of the Warsaw Pact military-industrial base by its resources
alone. In testimony before the Congress in early 1980, the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. European Command, General Bernard W. Rogers, said that the
risks and opportunities faced in the 1980' s: [8:12]
...must be assessed against the backdrop of a relentless accum-
ulation of Soviet military power over the past 15 years. This
military power has accrued, not as a result of some sudden
shift in priorities, but rather from a momentum derived from
conscious allocation of some 13-15 percent of the Soviet GNP
to their defense budget, with a 4-5 percent real increase each
year.
Of special concern is the effect of these sustained investments
on the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union, which
now contains the largest research and development manpower base
in the world; receives almost twice the investment funds of any
Alliance nation; and outproduces NATO at the rate of two or
three to one—or more— in most major weapons systems. It is an
industrial base capable of producing vast quantities of high
quality operational equipment in a relatively short time.
DOD has recognized that comfort can no longer be found in the belief that
somehow allied quality can overcome Warsaw Pact quantity. Recently,
greater emphasis has been placed on the issue of burden sharing by the
allies. This is especially true in view of the fact that many of the
NATO nations failed to attain the agreed goals of a three percent increase
in defense expenditures to build up NATO's defenses [8:13],
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However, this U.S. issue of burden sharing is counter balanced by
the European issue of benefit sharing. The Europeans have long desired
the economic benefits (jobs and technological pride and progress) from
the developing, producing, and selling of weapons to the U.S. The fac-
tor which prevents this from taking place is Europe's fragmented in-
dustrial base. Only three countries (Britain, France, and Germany) can
produce weapons on a continental scale, and no European country can pro-
duce weapons on an intercontinental scale. This has prohibited the NATO
allies from producing weapons competitive in quality, quantity and price
with those in the U.S., making a transfer of benefits impossible. As DOD
enters the 1980' s, the initiative in this area is for DOD to continue to
be the catalyst in promoting the resolution of the burden/benefit sharing
issue [8:13-14],
DOD has confirmed its policy of continued support and the support of
the Reagan Administration for RSI and armaments cooperation with our NATO
allies in a June 1981 memorandum from the new Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Frank C. Carlucci, which states in part: [9:1]
...more effective cooperation in armaments is now an imperative.
The Reagan Administration strongly supports U.S. and NATO coopera-
tive programs and initiatives that are designed to better co-
ordinate our use of research and development resources and provide
greater interoperability and standardization of our forces... we
will strive for cost effective cooperative programs, whenever
possible, which can meet U.S. and NATO Alliance requirements.
Therefore, international cooperative programs with NATO RSI will be the
primary thrust of DID current efforts into the 1980' s.
18

B. DOD CURRENT RSI INITIATIVES
DOD military initiatives for RSI have taken on increased emphasis due
to the instability in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
the present situation in Poland (1981), and the sustained arms build-up
by the Warsaw Pact countries. The principal objective in Europe is to
deter a Soviet invasion but should that invasion come the NATO Alliance
must be able to defeat it. This means coalition warfare, a kind of war-
fare dependent on standardization and interoperability of weapons and
equipment for effectiveness. To meet this challenge, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has continued in the 1980 's to build on a series of
initiatives to carry out the U.S. policy on RSI and armaments cooperation
with our NATO allies. These initiatives are: (1) mutual defense coopera-
tion through reciprocal procurement agreements; (2) dual production of
weapon systems which have already been developed; and (3) sharing the
development of next-generation families of weapons [8:81],
Mutual defense cooperation applies to memoranda of understanding which
are reciprocal agreements between two or more countries intended to pro-
mote arms cooperation and the review of armament programs and trade to
determine efficient uses of NATO resources through increased competition.
MOU's have been a primary means of furthering RSI within NATO through co-
operative action [5:2],
MOU's may be general or specific depending on their purpose. General
defense MOU's have various objectives, such as the waiver of "buy-
national" restrictions, increased cooperation in research, development,
procurement and production for greater standardization and interoperability,
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and to provide clarification of procedures stated in supplemental speci-
fic MOU's. To date, general MOU's have been negotiated with twelve NATO
countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, the
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Denmark. A current accomplish-
ment by DOD is the negotiation of two additional MOU's with Turkey and
Greece. This accomplishment now places agreements on armament cooperation
with all NATO nations which have significant defense industries [8:82]
[11:2-3].
While general MOU's establish basic guidelines regarding cooperative
efforts between nations, more "specific" MOU's are required to cover in-
dividual programs. Each "specific" MOU sets the level of reciprocity,
but separate technical agreements cover the detailed procedures in such
areas as financial arrangements, cost sharing formulae, or additional co-
production. Examples of weapon specific MOU's are: [5:18]
Cooperative Research and Development . Any method by which govern-
ments cooperate to make better use of their collective research
and development resources to include technical information ex-
change, harmonizing of requirements, codevelopment , interdependent
research and development, and agreement on standards.
Coproduction . Any method which (1) enables an eligible foreign
government, international organization, or designated commercial
producer to acquire the technical information and know-how to
manufacture or assemble in whole or in part an item of U.S. de-
fense equipment for use in the defense inventory of the foreign
government; or (2) acquires from a foreign government, internation-
al organization, or foreign commercial firm, the technical in-
formation to manufacture domestically a foreign weapon system or
subsystem for use by the Department of Defense.
DOD has recently negotiated a number of new weapon specific MOU's
between individual nations for cooperation in the development and produc-
tion of specific systems. Two of these agreements are the cooperative de-
velopment of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) with Germany and Denmark
20

and the cooperative development of the Multiple Launch Rocket System
(MLRS) with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom [10:4-5].
In order to place these MOU's with other nations into action, DOD is
presently holding industrial seminars with government and industry, repre-
sentatives from these nations. These seminars, which have led to greater
arms cooperation, are designed to explain the acquisition policies and
procedures of each nation and to provide an opportunity for the explora-
tion of possible U.S. and European "teaming" efforts. A key concept being
stressed by DOD at each of these seminars is the reciprocity of MOU's.
This means that bids for requirements from all participating nations must
be treated on an equal basis [8:82].
Dual production is the second DOD initiative toward achieving in-
creased RSI through armaments cooperation. Under this approach, a system
valuable to the Alliance which has already been developed by a member
nation would be produced by other nations in the Alliance. This approach
would lead to the near-term introduction to NATO forces of weapon systems
with the latest technology and to avoiding the developmental costs of
redundant programs [5:2].
Congress has conflicting views as to whether dual production actually
does reduce costs and decrease weapon system production time. The Com-
mittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, in a 1979 report
stated: [1:271]
This type of collaboration does little to procure for the NATO
Alliance the strongest possible defense force for the total funds
available. On the contrary, this type of production collaboration
actually costs the NATO countries substantially more than if they
had purchased the systems directly from producing nations. These
additional costs, primarily incurred in establishing duplicate
production facilities, tooling, test equipment, and training
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employees for the production work along with the additional time
lost in setting up the production capabilities, seems to be in-
herent in all cases of this type of collaboration.
However, the Committee went on to say that in large dual productions costs
to each country were reduced. It stated: [1:271-272]
...in cases where few duplicative production lines serve a large
number of procuring countries, the share of the R§D costs to be
assumed by each country is substantially reduced and the number
of items produced by each production line is substantially in-
creased. As a result, the cost per unit for each country is also
reduced. .. .Coproduct ion increases the total costs to about 150
percent of the total costs of procuring the total number of units
from a single production line. Under the coproduction arrangement,
however, the cost of each country becomes about 75 percent of in-
dependent production in its own country.
Nevertheless, DOD is still pursuing the dual production approach, notwith-
standing such criticism. Many new systems are now or will soon be pro-
duced under license in Europe and the U.S. Examples of such systems
produced in the U.S. are the Italian Oto Melara Mk75 Gunmount, the French/
German Roland Short Range Air Defense System, the Belgian MAG-58 Machine
Gun for Armored Vehicles, and the German 120mm Smooth Bore Tank Gun. U.S.
systems which are being produced in Europe are the F-16 Fighter, AIM-9L
Air-to-Air Missile, and the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier [8:82].
The third DOD initiative toward achieving increased RSI through
armaments cooperation is the families of weapons approach. Under this
approach, participating NATO nations attempt to reach early agreement on
the assignment of responsibility for developing complementary weapons
systems within a mission area. Weapons to be developed by each nation in
the near future are examined and grouped by mission area. The develop-
ment of the weapon systems is coordinated whenever possible. Again, the
objective of this approach is to save R&D funds through reducing duplica-




The family of weapons approach is the most recent of the three DOD
initiatives to become a reality. Because the concept is so new, there
has not been time to determine if two possible problems which could in-
hibit its effectiveness will be encountered.
The first possible problem is a security issue which involves the U.S.
longstanding policy of maintaining the capability to produce all the com-
ponents of its weapon systems within the country. Many government
officials believe the technological gap left by not maintaining this
policy would be detrimental to national security [1:271].
The second issue which may become a problem deals with the national
pride of the European nations and their desire to keep their work forces
employed. This may prompt European countries to choose weapon systems
produced in their country even if the systems are not the best available.
A survey conducted in the U.S. and Europe disclosed that of greater
priority to the European nations than savings to the Alliance through re-
duction of R§D efforts was employing their work forces without any drastic
reductions in size. Whether or not these two issues become problems
remains to be seen [1:271].
The first MOU making the family of weapons concept a reality was
signed by the U.S., the U.K., and Germany for air-to-air missiles in
August 1980. Under this MOU, the U.S. will develop an Advanced Medium
Range Missile (AMRAAM) while Germany and the U.K. will develop an Ad-
vanced Short Range Missile (ASRAAM) . Expected results of this program,
which may be optimistic, are savings of from $400-500 million in R&D
costs as well as an improved air combat capability for the Alliance.
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Other family of weapons MOU's have been signed or are being negotiated and
are near the signature stage [8:83],
Other current RSI initiatives by DOD which should be mentioned are:
the continued program for implementation of RSI within DOD; the training
of DOD acquisition personnel and U.S. industry for the growing internation-
al business environment; investigation of second sourcing in Europe; and
the review of foreign ownership, control or influence regulations (FOCI).
DOD is continuing its active role of implanting the principles of RSI
in its internal procedures. The March 1980 revision of DOD Directive
2010.6, "Standardization and Interoperability of Weapon Systems and Equip-
ment within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," brings together all
major DOD policies, procedures, and component responsibilities for achiev-
ing RSI objectives. Immediately following its revision is the revision of
DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2 which set forth detailed
policy and procedures on major systems acquisition. Practices that indivi-
dual services must follow to insure RSI concerns are taken into considera-
tion in the acquisition of major systems are detailed in these documents
[8:89].
Increased emphasis by NATO on DOD's triad of initiatives for armament
cooperation has forecast the opening of defense markets and increased
international acquisition in NATO for the 1980' s. To prepare DOD acquisi-
tion personnel and U.S. industry for doing business in the international
environment, DOD has embarked on and completed or is in the process of
completing a number of initiatives which are: [8:90]
(1) Revise Section VI of the DAR, Foreign Purchasing
(2) Conduct a multinational codevelopment/coproduction workshop
to assimilate DOD experience to date
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(3) Expand the Defense Systems Management College Basic Course
on International Program Management
(4) Develop international acquisition "guides" and conduct
"International Acquisition Strategy" panels for program managers
(5) Explore ways to conserve NATO government managerial resources
in the international business environment
DOD is also exploring the possibility of procuring major defense sys-
tems from Europe as a second source. U.S. purchases from European pro-
duction runs could be economically beneficial as well as logistically
advantageous in terms of providing equipment more rapidly to using units
[8:89].
Finally, DOD is reviewing Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence reg-
ulations to ensure policies adequately protect classified technological
information while not inhibiting progress toward NATO RSI [8:90].
C. IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTING ON THE ACQUISITION MANAGER
As previously stated, RSI policy has acquired increased emphasis as a
result of the instability in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the present situation in Poland, and the sustained arms build-
up by Warsaw Pact countries. The primary vehicle DOD intends to use to
further this policy is international cooperative programs with our NATO
allies. The acquisition manager is assured of experiencing greater in-
volvement in the international arena as he is tasked with effecting
business relationships between the parties of transatlantic cooperative
efforts. The challenges he will face from the contracting aspect alone
are numerous
.
The acquisition manager will have to acquire knowledge of the gener-
al characteristics of the European industrial environment. He will
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require a more detailed working knowledge of the specific characteristics
surrounding the defense industry in the country or countries with which
he is doing business. Many of these environmental factors which have
created substantial differences between the U.S. and European procurement
systems will become major hurdles to overcome in effecting business
relationships with the European countries.
The different views on competition by the U.S. and Europe will
generate problems for the acquisition manager in selecting foreign con-
tractors for a program and complying with the U.S. requirement that com-
petition is the preferred method to be used.
The different views and means by which U.S. and European societies
carry out socio-economic objectives is another problem in that these
different methods can drive the cost of a program upward.
The acquisition manager will encounter many problems in the financial
aspects of international contracting. He will have to devise methods to
establish the price of a contract which will not be affected later by
fluctuations in the value of currencies.
Another financial problem to overcome is the difference in pricing
regulations. The accounting systems of the European countries differ to
varying degrees from the U.S. system. Many costs which are unallowable by
law in the U.S. are allowable under foreign accounting systems. Also,
these costs may not be separated from other costs as required in the U.S.
The acquisition manager is faced with the problem of establishing a finan-
cial system which complies with U.S. laws and regulations yet does not
attempt the impossible—changing a foreign nation's traditional system.
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A third financial problem the acquisition manager must solve, is how
to audit the books and records of a foreign contractor in accordance with
the U.S. requirement and to do so without becoming an unacceptable in-
trusion into the foreign country's affairs.
A problem of another type over which the acquisition manager may not
have any control, but in which he shares considerable interest with the
European nations, is technology transfer. This decision may not be
singularly left to him but may require approval from many different agen-
cies of the U.S. Government. However, once approved, the acquisition
manager has the responsibility to ensure that the transfer of technology
is properly accomplished and procedurally controlled. What he will find
in the international arena is that the procedures many foreign govern-
ments have concerning licensing, patents and data rights differ signifi-
cantly from the established procedures in the United States [12:2].
For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, all intellectual
property rights are retained by the contractor, who commits himself to
licensing all required intellectual property to a second source designa-
ted by the FRG Government. In the U.S. the government retains the rights
to the intellectual property for which it has paid to have developed.
However, the government cannot transfer the data to a foreign nation
without contractor consideration. This is but one example of many such
differences between U.S. and European systems. It should be pointed out
that the European system itself is not uniform, but procedures vary from
country to country.
A final difference in the U.S. /European environment which will be
mentioned that impacts on all aspects of the acquisition manager's task
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is the language barrier. In the process of melding the requirements of
each country's acquisition regulations, the acquisition manager will
find that the legal meaning of many contract clauses in English is inter-
preted totally differently in another language. Translation of these
clauses may be difficult or impossible. Also, the language barrier
problem is one to be reckoned with at the negotiating table.
The continual expansion of the acquisition process into the inter-
national arena will present numerous problems such as these and others
for the acquisition manager. As doing business internationally becomes
more and more a necessary fact of life, he must make the transition





As indicated in the previous chapter, armaments cooperation between
the U.S. and European allies will be increasing in the 1980' s. The ac-
quisition manager will be experiencing greater involvement and chal-
lenges in the international business environment and must make the
transition from domestic to international acquisition manager. To accom-
plish this, he must learn his new environment and master the unique re-
quirements of contracting in the international arena. The purpose of
this chapter is to provide an overview of the European contracting en-
vironment and to identify some of the acquisition manager's major consider-
ations in formulating acquisition strategy and in contract management.
B. EUROPEAN CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT
Key to an understanding of the European contracting environment is an
understanding of the general characteristics of the European defense in-
dustry. One of the most important characteristics is its division among
three "tiers" of countries.
The first tier comprises Germany j France, and the United Kingdom,
which are the three most industrialized countries in Western Europe.
These countries account for approximately 80 percent of Western Europe's
arms industry output, although these countries only represent about 54
percent of the NATO European population.
The second tier is comprised of the next three most industrialized
and populous countries, which are Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.
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These countries are responsible for approximately 12 percent of arms
industry output while accounting for only 25 percent of the NATO European
population.
The third tier is comprised of the remaining NATO countries which
account for 8 percent of the arms industry output while only 22 percent
of the NATO European population [11:12-1].
Of the first tier countries, France and the United Kingdom export
more arms than they import, indicating that their arras market is larger
than just domestic consumption. Germany has also become a net exporter
of arms during the past three years it has been a member of NATO. Of the
second tier countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have in recent years
balanced their own domestic demand with their production capacity. How-
ever, Italy has moved up into the consistent net exporter ranks [11:12-1]
The greatest amount of attention has been focused on the first tier
countries because as stated they alone account for approximately 80 per-
cent of the NATO defense industry. An important characteristic in addi-
tion to size and role which applies primarily to France and the United
Kingdom but also to Germany is that a wide spectrum of technologies and
weapon systems are covered by their armament industries. None of the
second or third tier countries are characterized by a wide spectrum of
weapon systems, while they may meet the criteria for technologies. The
second tier countries do have individual companies that have been
suppliers of specialized weapons to other NATO and non-NATO countries
for a long time [11:12-1].
The defense industries of France and the United Kingdom develop and
produce the widest number and types of armaments and associated
30

technologies, with France being the largest. They cover the complete
spectrum from independent nuclear weapons and strategic missile develop-
ment and production to the production of small arms and ammunition. This
national policy seems to evolve from a desire for independence or equality
with other NATO partners. On the other hand, Germany has resolved not to
develop and produce nuclear weapons or strategic missiles. Only recent-
ly has the German aerospace industry received government support and
been allowed to expand [11:12-1].
Codevelopment is considered by the first tier countries to be an
essential segment of multinational collaboration, including cooperative
arrangements with the U.S. This has been insisted on for a long time
by industries in France and the United Kingdom, but not until recently
have German industries insisted that codevelopment be part of any trans-
atlantic collaboration in lieu of U.S. licenses without codevelopment.
Also being advocated is that any transatlantic collaboration should be
carried out between a European multinational group and the U.S. rather
than on a bilateral basis [11:12-2].
Of equal importance to understanding the general characteristics of
the European defense industry is an understanding of the European govern-
ment/industry relationship. There are a number of organizational and
legal forms which represent this relationship.
In the U.S., the defense industry is characterized primarily by in-
dependent industrial corporations which are publicly owned through stock
which is traded. In Europe, many key industries, such as in France and
the U.K., are nationalized and totally or almost totally government
owned. For the rest of the individual companies throughout Western
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Europe, the tradition of private ownership holds true. However, as in
the U.S., many individual companies are totally or almost totally owned
by conglomerates which in many cases may be foreign owned multinationals.
As a general rule throughout Western Europe these individual companies are
operated by professional corporate managers who are normally employees
rather than owners of the companies [11:12-10].
The relationship of European governments to industry is also based on
the function of markets and broad government policy. European defense
markets are only one-eighth to one-tenth the size of U.S. markets and
therefore cannot support more than one to three companies in the defense
industry. Exports do not relieve this problem since the purchasers of
exports are hesitant to buy weapons not used in the exporting nation's own
armed forces. The small market size thus confers an almost "sole-source"
status on the small number of European defense industries [11:12-11].
However, it should be mentioned that the sole-source nature of
European defense industries does not decrease their dependence on export
markets for their financial and economic health. Exports are still a
primary concern of government and industry from the arms balance of
trade viewpoint and the augmentation of production to reduce R§D costs
[11:12-11].
Another key concept which is important to recognize, for a clear pers-
pective on the European contracting environment, is that there is consider-
ably less competition in Europe. This difference between the amount of
competition in U.S. and European defense acquisition is a major hurdle
to overcome in transatlantic collaboration. The reason for less compe-
tition in Europe is both historical and structural, with the historical
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aspect being of less importance. Briefly, the historical aspect of
European competition is related to the ancient guild system with its
restrictions on the entry into and control over practices of the various
trades and professions. As large industries have developed, this guild
system has been replaced by large industrial unions which now have be-
come the important centers of labor and trade influence [11:4-8].
The structural aspects are much more influential in creating less
competition in Europe than the U.S. Essentially there are two signifi-
cant factors which are closely connected. The first factor is concerned
with the size of the market. Although the first and second tier NATO
nations have as many varied defense systems as the U.S., the production
numbers of such systems in these nations are much smaller. Also, the
third tier nations do not have as many varied defense systems as a result
of their limited access to export markets, and this makes production of
many types of systems impractical and economically infeasible for them.
These economic limitations on the large and small nations which reduce
the market size create the second factor, which is a fewer number of
companies to generate competition. Further reducing the number of com-
panies, is the heavy emphasis placed on mergers by the European govern-
ments. While these mergers tend to strengthen the European industrial
base, they have reduced the number of companies in some areas of the
European defense industry to as few as two.
The limited amount of competition in the European defense industry
also creates a difference in U.S. and European business policies, which
is another characteristic that should be recognized. European business
practices are aimed at the cooperation and integration of the limited
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market and technological-industrial base resources which are available.
For weapon system collaborative efforts in Europe, the key issues become
the number of each nation's employees that will participate in the work,
the amount of technology that will be shared in research and development
and the size of the market each nation receives. Collaborative efforts
such as these are usually only conducted for those projects in which a
common requirement has been identified and the sources to carry out the
project from design to production selected [11:4-8,9].
Another aspect of European business policies which is different from
the U.S. is that weapon systems acquisition programs are not reviewed
each year by the government and subject to the possibility of cancella-
tion. Once a commitment is made for a program, it is made for the
planned life of the program. European programs are therefore often
more stable and assured funding for the entire program [11:4-9].
Still another characteristic of the European contracting environment
is the educational level of industry personnel. In Europe, the backbone
of industry is made up of the non-university engineers and the center of
the workshops consists of the trademasters. A non-university engineer
completes his education in about seven years. He spends 25 hours in the
classroom and 15 hours on the drafting board and in the workshop per
week. A trademaster also completes his education in about seven years
but with 10 hours in the classroom and 30 hours on the shop floor per
week. On the other hand, a university engineer completes his education
in about five years, with approximately 35 hours in the classroom and
seven hours on the shop floor per week. This varied education permits
greater flexibility in industry by enabling these industry personnel to
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communicate down to the shop level and up to the development laboratory.
This wide talent distribution permits flexible manufacturing programs
which allow European industry to achieve efficient production of small
lots. The U.S. instead utilizes large manufacturing programs with high
specialization and large outputs [11:4-5].
Another difference characteristic of the European environment is in
the area of taxation. There is no codified general "European tax
theory." However, there is a common view which is shared by Europeans
toward taxation and more specifically toward the definition of profit.
The European approach to taxation is a practical one. This approach has
evolved out of the lessons learned by the Europeans from World War II
which ended with the complete collapse of the European economy. The
essential element of the approach taken by European governments is the
view that private business is a source of employment and government
should support business in a number of ways, such as tax incentives,
minimum legislative constraints, and protection. Private business is to
help pay for a large portion of social benefits, like social security,
in return. Therefore, this approach ties together the elements of
profit, social benefits, and job security [11:4-9,10],
In line with this approach, European governments attempt to foster
segments of private business through the application of short-term
depreciation. This generates new business in a specific segment as a
result of the large tax incentive created. Also, in Europe, private
business cannot only recoup the original capital invested in plant and
equipment, which is the usual purpose of depreciation, but accumulate




Another tax incentive utilized by European governments to foster
private business is the tax-free profit incentive. To spur industrial
growth when desired, many governments declare tax-free, profits re-
invested in the company of origin within one year. This discourages the
migrating of profits through diversification [11:4-10].
A final characteristic, which should be discussed, is the European
labor stability and compensation practices. In Europe, there is no formal
legal obligation which requires industry to stabilize its labor force.
However, it is a reality which is enforced by institutionalized actions,
such as union contracts which address severance pay, complaint procedures,
etc. The closest example to this situation in the U.S. would be efforts
by Congress to pass job protection laws in the case of factory closings
or relocation. These widespread restraints on the layoff of personnel
tend to drive European production costs upward. It is this European goal
of maintaining the employment level at the expense of increased indus-
trial capability or employment which makes cost effective cooperative
efforts difficult [11:4-11],
There are several compensation factors which should be noted. Total
compensation for the European worker tends toward a larger percentage of
fringe benefits, than for a U.S. worker. This tends to provide a greater
motivation for European workers to remain with the same company in order
to retain their benefits, thus creating very low mobility. Vacation needs
of European workers are met through entire plant shut-downs which create
a certain amount of inflexibility. Finally, there are strict regulations
on overtime and shifts which further contribute to this inflexibility.
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These factors create scheduling obstacles to integrating cooperative
programs which are difficult to overcome [11:4-11].
These characteristics of the European contracting environment are
only a small portion of those which could be discussed. The acquisition
manager must develop a detailed knowledge of each country's character-
istics as he deals with specific governments and companies.
C. RSI ACQUISITION STRATEGY
While understanding the characteristics of the European contracting
environment is an absolute essential prerequisite for the U.S. internation-
al acquisition manager, his central most important function is formulating
the RSI acquisition strategy. Guidance for developing an acquisition
strategy is contained in DOD Instruction 5000.2, which reads as follows:
[7:9]
Acquisition strategy is the conceptual basis of the overall plan that
an acquisition manager follows in program execution. It reflects
the management concepts that shall be used in directing and con-
trolling all elements of the acquisition in response to specific
goals and objectives of the program and in ensuring that the
system being acquired satisfies the approved mission need. Ac-
quisition strategy encompasses the entire acquisition process. The
strategy shall be developed in sufficient detail, at the time of
issuing the solicitations, to permit competitive exploration of al-
ternative system design concepts in the concept development phase.
Additionally, sufficient planning must be accomplished for succeed-
ing program phases, including production, for those considerations
that may have a direct influence on competition and design efforts
by contractors. The acquisition strategy shall evolve through an
iterative process and become increasingly definitive in describing
the interrelationship of the management, technical, business
resource, force structure, support, testing, and other aspects of
the program.
The acquisition strategy, therefore, forms the basis for the overall
acquisition plan by which the acquisition manager hopes to achieve his pro-
gram objectives. In the NATO program environment these objectives are
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usually set forth in the memoranda of understanding (MOU) signed by the
participating countries. The objectives become the basis on which the
major areas of the acquisition strategy are formulated. These major
areas are: the contracting strategy, business/financial strategy, tech-
nical strategy, and integrated logistics support strategy [11:5-1]. The
contracting and business/financial strategies will be discussed later
since these strategies are associated with the problems that will be
addressed in the next chapter.
Each strategy must be tailored to the individual program, as in any
acquisition strategy. As the program evolves so does the strategy to
allow for change and to reduce the element of risk. The acquisition
strategy must never become a rigid plan but must remain flexible enough
to change as the program changes. In international programs this flexi-
bility is even more important because there are many more legal restric-
tions and approvals required [11:5-1].
The RSI acquisition strategy must pursue standardization and inter-
operability on a priority basis. U.S. emphasis is placed on this to
conserve scarce R§D resources and to increase the military effectiveness
of Alliance forces. Also included in the strategy should be the consider-
ation of competition to obtain trade-offs between cost, performance,
schedule and supportability whenever there is an overall benefit to the
NATO participants in the program. The acquisition strategy should be
just that, a strategy, for guiding functional implementation plans and
not contain planning details itself. The interrelationships among the
participating countries' management, technical, business, resource,
military force structure, support, testing and other program aspects
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should be defined and the strategy should address what responses are
desired to program problems disruptive of progress [11:5-2].
In formulating the contracting strategy, the acquisition manager must
decide on the contracting approach and methods which will be used. In
developing the contracting approach there are several considerations.
One consideration is the impact prior contracts or other commitments
made before the current acquisition life cycle phase may have on the pro-
gram. All such commitments or contracts should be identified and the
constraints they have on the program understood. This also includes
elements of other contracts which may affect sub-systems or components
of the program [11:5-6].
For example, the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is the basic
responsibility of the U.S. Infantry Fighting Vehicles Systems Office,
but the M-42 submunitions are the responsibility of the project manager's
Office for Selected Ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal. The MLRS XM-445
electronic fuse is being developed by Harry Diamond Laboratories, and the
Federal Republic of Germany is developing a scatterable mine warhead for
the MLRS. This example should make it obvious that sub-programs may
have a significant impact on the primary program [11:5-6].
There are many different types of contracts available to the acquisi-
tion manager in deciding on the contracting approach. The difficulty
comes in selecting the contract type that fits the particular circumstances
and provides a fair and equitable legal relationship for all participants.
Each program has a specific set of unique features and the contracting
type and approach that is chosen must bring together time, cost, tech-
nology and management environment. The acquisition strategy should
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allow flexibility and make available many different options for con-
tracting. This enables the acquisition manager to develop a realistic
schedule and formulate a contracting strategy which considers competition
when beneficial. Resources can then be utilized efficiently and develop-
ment time reduced since contractor personnel have the flexibility to ex-
plore competing approaches. Contracting is not a substitute for manage-
ment but a tool for management's use. The overall contracting strategy
should consider procurement lead times, avoid technical leveling, and
encourage innovation in proposals submitted for the next planned
increment [11:5-7].
When considering what contracting methodology to use, the acquisition
manager has numerous choices during each phase of the acquisition life
cycle. The contracting methodology associated with the problems to be
discussed in Chapter IV is codevelopment
.
Codevelopment is an effective method of transferring technology for
cooperative efforts within NATO. Benefits in terms of price and technical
competition can be derived from the teaming efforts of domestic and
foreign contractors. In cases where one contractor lacks the development
and production resources required, teaming through the codevelopment
method can provide the necessary development and production resources
required. The teams may also be used at some later date to compete for
the production contract [11:5-8].
A contracting methodology which is sometimes applied when competition
is used during the development phase is the use of a technology transfer
clause. This clause in the development contract requires the licensing
of technical information to the winner of a production contract if it is
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a different company. Royalties and compensation are paid for technical
assistance from the licensing contractor. A problem which may be en-
countered in this strategy is the unwillingness on the part of many com-
panies to part with proprietary information necessary for the success of
cooperative efforts. Critical production delays and "buy-ins" by firms
seeking trade secrets are sometimes the result [11:5-8],
There are many other contracting methodologies available to the ac-
quisition manager such as a leader- follower arrangement, second sourc-
ing, breakouts, and pre-planned product improvement. Once again, the
problem is selecting the right one for each unique situation.
In formulating the business/financial strategy the acquisition
manager must consider all program aspects related to funding and budget-
ing, investment decisions, utilization of personnel and contractor
resources, schedule management, business base evaluation and others.
Issues, with which the business/financial strategy is concerned, are
the amount, timing, and sources of funds, the extent of competition to
be infused into the program, and the distribution of development/
production tasks among the industrial sectors of the nations participating
[11:5-10].
Source selection is one of the major decisions in the business/
financial strategy. Political considerations surrounding the issue of
offsets often affect this decision. The defense and industrial base
of each participating nation must be evaluated, and extensive research
may be required. A thorough understanding of industrial base potential
by the acquisition manager is necessary to ensure offsets are placed
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with the capable industries in each participating nation and the program
is structured properly under the political constraints [11:5-10].
In domestic business/financial strategy the use of competition is
emphasized throughout a program's life cycle. However, when foreign
participation enters a program, the options on competition may be limited
»
to the developmental phase. These limitations may be because of offset
requirements, intellectual property rights, or other conditions written
into the memorandum of understanding which restrict the acquisition
[11:5-10].
Another issue which must be addressed in the business/financial
strategy is the efficient utilization of all program resources, which in-
cludes support from both domestic and foreign management, systems con-
tractors, government laboratories, universities, and industry. One
method which is often used by acquisition managers to limit the number
of contracts they have to monitor, is to use an integrating contractor.
Under this method a contractor is selected as the major contractor who
then coordinates the activities of all other contractors involved in the
program. This may be accomplished by either (1) selecting a prime con-
tractor who then subcontracts for the various parts of the program or
(2) by the program office placing the contracts and then contracting
with a single contractor to provide the technical coordination of the
work [11:5-10].
All strategies which have been discussed, as well as other strategies
not mentioned, are important, and emphasis must be placed on each by the
acquisition manager for successful formulation of the overall RSI ac-
quisition strategy. The appropriateness of this strategy, as developed
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by the acquisition manager, will determine the program's success or
failure.
D. RSI CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The intent of Congress and the executive branch with respect to RSI
objectives can be viewed from the contract management standpoint as trans-
national ventures. Essentially these ventures involve the melding of
procuring governments and their industrial counterparts into an effective
business arrangement for the proper utilization of resources necessary
for a cooperative effort. Successfully accomplishing these RSI objectives
requires the acquisition manager to develop an RSI acquisition strategy
that provides for the level of NATO sources appropriate for the program.
The contracting aspect in developing this strategy is a key element
which must receive specific attention. Since much of DOD contracting
procedure is rigid and complex, having its basis in public law, it is
essential the acquisition manager become sensitive to contract management
considerations early on, if the RSI acquisition strategy goals and con-
cepts are to be successfully achieved [11:7-3],
The contracting process starts with a program approval document, that,
in the case of codevelopment programs, is a program specific memorandum
of understanding (MOU) . This document, as stated earlier, is an agreement
between participating nations that identifies the program's objectives
and goals and forms the basis for the acquisition strategy. The initial
drafting of this document, from the contracting point of view, is extreme-
ly important to the acquisition manager. Once commitments are made be-
tween countries and later become contractual obligations, they are
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difficult if not impossible to change. In codevelopment efforts the
MOU takes the place of the DAR, which has the force and effect of law.
The acquisition manager must ensure no commitments are made which con-
flict with present procurement laws and regulations and, therefore, are
impossible to perform on the part of the U.S. Government or industry.
In the past, industry has often been committed to actions which it could
not perform. To avoid the above from taking place, it is essential that
industry participate as an advisor along with the contract specialist on
the acquisition manager's team in the MOU drafting [11:7-5],
The requirement specification is the next major step in the process.
It is important contractually that a clear communication of the require-
ment, understandable by all participants, be obtained. This may be diffi-
cult to accomplish given the different languages, but it is absolutely
essential if the requirement is to be communicated to potential sources
[11:7-5].
The third major step is the purchase request, which integrates the
Statements of Work (SOW) and funding citation. The SOW describes what
the contractor must do to achieve the contractual requirements and must
include any specific efforts and economic participation requirements
unique to the program. It must identify whether U.S. or NATO standards
will be used and incorporate the business requirements of the MOU. The
fund citation may contain certain financial constraints such as the
level and timing of national contributions, provisions on currency ex-
change and the incremental funding plan. All financial constraints and
commitments on the part of the participating countries must be communicated
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to potential offerors so they are fully aware of all risks being taken in
the acquisition and can bid accordingly [11:7-6].
Industry participation is brought into the process by means of the
fourth major step, which is the request for proposal (RFP) . This docu-
ment must communicate to industry all aspects of the requirement, includ-
ing the RSI goals and objectives. The uniform contract format in the
DAR can serve as the basic structure of the document but it must be care-
fully drafted to overcome the language, business, and conceptual under-
standing differences of the participants. The acquisition manager should
ensure all potential sources, both domestic and foreign, are aware of the
solicitation by such means as public announcement and presolicitation
conferences. DOD policy on acquisitions with foreign source participation
is that normally they will be competitive and must meet all requirements
such as performance, quality, delivery schedule and cost no more than
other comparable products eligible for award [11:7-7].
During the next step of the process, which is the receipt and evalua-
tion of the contractors' proposals, the acquisition manager must be aware
that each contractor's recommended solution to the requirement will
probably be different along with the business structure that is proposed.
The procedure that is used during evaluation must take into consideration
the important elements of this business structure which bear on the
success of the U.S. achieving the goals established in the MOU [11:7-8],
As the contracting process moves toward award of the contract, a
series of negotiations will be conducted. Before any contract is
negotiated with a U.S. prime contractor requiring the services of
foreign subcontractors or with a foreign prime contractor, several
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essential reviews must take place. First, it is necessary to have a
review made by DOD for the purpose of identifying those mandatory flow-
down provisions which do not pertain to foreign procurements or would not
be workable in the procurement in question [11:5-7].
Next, contract provisions should be reviewed before any discussions
are held with foreign governments or suppliers to ensure all provisions
are required and desired. The results of these reviews must be made
available to the DOD or industry negotiating team [11:5-7].
Finally, all problems encountered in the acceptance of mandatory flow-
down provisions by foreign governments or suppliers should be documented
by the negotiating team and given to DOD for review. The purpose of this
review is to delete or revise those provisions which prove to be not
applicable in total or part [11:5-7],
When the actual contractual negotiations take place, the acquisition
manager must give consideration to support in the form of assistance
(which includes audits) from the foreign governments. In cases where
foreign subcontractors are involved, the procedures for audit of the
foreign contractor's proposals need to be agreed upon by the U.S. and
participating European governments. Further considerations, in the area
of pricing and audit, will be addressed later. The overall objective
critical to the outcome of the negotiations is that all parties arrive at
a complete and similar understanding of the contract terms and conditions
to avoid non-compliance or misinterpretation of the requirements later
[11:7-8].
After contract award, the acquisition manager has several options
available for the administration of the contract. For U.S. sources the
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normal channels apply, but in the case of foreign sources, contract ad-
ministration service (CAS) may be performed by the CAS of the specific
nation, the U.S. CAS assigned to the particular area, or by a separate
CAS organization established specifically for the program [11:7-9].
In addition to the considerations already mentioned throughout the
overview of the international contractual process, there are several
other legal and financial considerations that impact on contracting in
the international environment.
The acquisition manager must consider, in addition to U.S. laws and
regulations, certain other international agreements between the U.S. and
European nations which govern foreign acquisition. Essentially these
agreements provide that the United States may carry out European acquisi-
tions in one of three ways: (1) by acquisition under U.S. laws and regu-
lations without significant constraints by the government of the country
where the acquisition is being accomplished; (2) by acquisition only
through an agency of the government where the acquisition is being accom-
plished and under the laws and regulations of that country; (3) or by ac-
quisition under a mixed procedure where U.S. regulations apply in some
situations while the regulations of the country where the acquisition is
being accomplished apply in other situations. The last procedure is the
one which is most commonly used in Europe [11:7-10].
Another basic consideration of the acquisition manager in the legal
area is Section VI of the DAR. While the elements of contract law
filter through the contract environment, the DAR outlines specific con-
tract management considerations which have the force and effect of law.
These considerations involve contract principles, accounting, pricing,
47

finance, subcontracting, terminations and contract administration. The
acquisition manager must deal with this considerable body of guidance
and direction when making RSI contract management decisions [11:7-10],
A final legal consideration concerns contract disputes. While the
procedures effecting the resolution of domestic contractual disputes are
clearly delineated, this is not the case for NATO foreign acquisitions.
The U.S. Contracts Disputes Act of 1978 is not applicable and the only
practical remedy may be in direct diplomatic negotiations between
governments [11:7-17].
The acquisition manager must also recognize several additional con-
siderations in the financial area. The first consideration deals with
the various differences in foreign pricing not encountered on domestic
contracts. When evaluating foreign suppliers, these differences may
affect the evaluation when competition exists so that comparisons be-
tween contractors have to be made on a "total cost" basis. In a sole
source situation, differences in pricing must be evaluated prior to
negotiations with the contractor since many special costs that affect
pricing can be reduced through special provisions in the program specific
MOU [11:10-9].
In analyzing foreign prices, one difficulty which may be encountered
is the reluctance of European contractors to provide detailed cost data.
This reluctance is based primarily on the European concept that the mar-
ket place determines if a price is fair and reasonable. The acquisition
manager's only resort in this case may be to try and generate competition
and hope it results in a price which is fair and reasonable [11:10-9].
Another difficulty that may be encountered in pricing is the prob-
lem of partially hidden costs such as special handling, storage, taxes,
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and transportation. Many of these costs which are hidden must be con-
sidered as they may become direct costs to the purchaser [11:10-9].
A final pricing difficulty relates to the impact currency exchange
arrangements may have on pricing. In an attempt to avoid this problem,
the acquisition manager should address in the MOU which currency will be
used in pricing the contract, currency exchange timing, currency rate
determination bases and currency fluctuation risk sharing [11:10-9].
The last consideration in the financial area discussed concerns audit
requirements by the Department of Defense. The increase in collabora-
tive efforts has resulted in a large number of contracts and subcontracts
being placed in NATO countries. This has created difficulties for the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) , not only in the audit of these
contracts, but also in the compliance of European countries with DAR
cost determination principles. A large number of European governments
prefer to use their own audit and cost determination regulations and pro-
cedures by negotiating special arrangements with the U.S. This has
created many problems for the acquisition manager in accommodating the
different variations and in determining fair and reasonable contract
prices [11:10-6].
The acquisition manager must take these major considerations and
others into account as he implements his RSI acquisition strategy and
proceeds along each step of the contracting process if the RSI goals
and objectives established in the MOU are to be successfully accomplished,
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IV. CONTRACTING USING FOREIGN PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
A. GENERAL
As indicated in the previous chapters, the acquisition manager is
confronted with the complex task of effecting business relationships be-
tween the parties of transatlantic cooperative efforts. As stated, this
requires the melding of procurement systems with substantial differences
due to the unique U.S. and European environments from which they evolved.
Although difficult, this has been less of a problem in the past because
predominately established U.S. procurement policies and procedures, with
few deviations to accommodate the foreign countries, have been followed
in all efforts involving the U.S.
The few deviations which have been made include the waiver of those
provisions which are considered not applicable to contracts with foreign
governments or industry and over which the executive branch of the U.S.
Government has waiver authority. There exist other provisions which are
not applicable, but these have not been waived by the executive branch,
due to their basis on statute or law or due to their political sensitiv-
ity and therefore reluctance on the part of the U.S. to waive them.
DOD made initial efforts to relieve the international contracting pro-
cess of these statutory provisions by requesting broad authority from
Congress to waive any or all conflicting provisions where DOD deter-
mined international concerns took precedence over domestic ones. Con-
gress did not allow this authority because of concern over the
preservation of the U.S. competitive process and the lack of assurance
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that U.S. industry and labor would receive equitable treatment while dis-
parities between U.S. and European industrial capabilities were being
resolved.
These statutory provisions have been reluctantly accepted by foreign
countries in the past because failure to do so on their part would mean
that U.S. appropriations could not be spent in their countries. However,
within the past two years foreign countries (primarily the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the United Kingdom) have been pursuing the utiliza-
tion of their procurement procedures. Their argument has followed
basically two lines: (1) as a sovereign government, the laws and regula-
tions of other governments should not be applicable; and (2) it is
inefficient to require industry to apply two sets of contracting policies
and procedures. Both of these arguments have some merit.
Now that the European countries are achieving a true partnership with
the U.S. and are putting increased emphasis on achieving NATO defense
efforts, they feel it is time the U.S. accepted their sovereignty on
these issues. Therefore, the waiver of only a few of the U.S. procure-
ment provisions, not applicable to contracts with foreign governments
and industry, is just a temporary measure. It is uncertain how much
longer U.S. contracting provisions will be accepted. The Europeans ex-
pect further action on the part of the U.S. if they are to continue to
participate in cooperative efforts.
B. CENTRAL ISSUE
The question which has to be addressed when contracting with foreign
governments and industries is "whose procurement policies and practices
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will be followed?" As stated, DOD policy is presently to apply U.S.
procurement policies and procedures with the exception of those provisions,
such as socio-economic clauses, which are not applicable in contracting
with foreign countries. The basis for this policy is fair and equal
competition. The belief, in general, is that foreign firms should not
be treated any differently than U.S. firms. Any foreign firm competing
for a contract in the U.S. should have to comply with the same procure-
ment policies and procedures that competing U.S. firms must accommodate or
foreign industries may have an unfair advantage over U.S. industries. In
turn, it is the policy of the U.S. to interpose no objections to the
application of any foreign procurement policies and procedures con-
sidered appropriate by foreign governments or industry when contracting
directly with U.S. companies.
The objective of this policy is not to force U.S. procurement rules
and regulations on foreign countries, as evidenced by the acceptance of
their regulations when they are the contracting country, but to maintain
the essential element on which U.S. procurement is based--fair and equal
competition. This is an element which, as mentioned in previous chap-
ters, is not considered a critical element of the European procurement
system.
To date, this policy has been basically adhered to with only the appli-
cation of certain U.S. contracting provisions being waived as a result of
increasing pressure from foreign countries. Many of these provisions,
such as socio-economic clauses and others, are justified in being
waived as they were never applicable to contracting with foreign coun-
tries from the start. Still other provisions, as stated earlier, are
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not applicable and should have been waived but have not because they are
based on statutes or law or due to their sensitivity. However, the cen-
tral issue does not lie with any of these provisions because they do not
have a major impact on the fair and equal competition between U.S. and
foreign contractors but only create an administrative burden to the
timely execution of the contracting process.
The U.S. contracting provisions which have created the greatest im-
pact and which might lead to an unfair competitive advantage for foreign
contractors, if they are allowed to use their own regulations, are U.S.
pricing and audit provisions. The Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
,
Section XV defines the costs incurred that are allowable in contracts
entered into with DOD. The allowability or non-allowability of several
of these cost elements are based on statute while others are regulatory.
Because of the concept of fair and equal competition stated above and
other reasons there has been a reluctance by the Department of Defense
to grant any waivers to these cost allowability principles, whether
regulatory or based on statute, although these charges may be considered
normal and acceptable by foreign businesses and governments.
DAR, Appendix 0, Cost Accounting Standards, defines the allocability
of costs. Likewise, the cost accounting principles of foreign busi-
ness and governments may vary widely from these principles. In some
cases these variations may only be theoretical differences with no
practical change in costs allocated to a particular contract while in
other cases there may be a material change in costs allocated. In both
cases of allowability and allocability, partial waivers allowing foreign
countries to use their regulations have been granted for those
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provisions not based on statute only after very long, tedious and ad-
ministratively costly reviews of the cost accounting principles in use
by the foreign firm or country. These waivers have only been granted
on a case by case basis and can, in no sense, be taken as a sign of
willingness by DOD to obtain additional waivers. An exception to this
is the recent waiver on a permanent basis of all cost accounting stan-
dards (CAS) for contracts and subcontracts awarded to foreign govern-
ments and their agencies and the waiver of all CAS except 401 (Con-
sistency in Estimating, Accumulating and Reporting Costs) and 402
(Consistency in Allocating Costs Incurred for the Same Purpose) for all
foreign firms.
The other difficult area concerns audit provisions. It is preferred
that audit of foreign contractors be performed by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) . However , foreign firms and governments have begun
to insist on the use of their own auditors. Waivers have been granted
that allow auditors of foreign governments to act as representatives of
the U.S. in auditing foreign contracts and subcontracts. This is another
provision that creates significant problems for the U.S.
The waiver of these provisions has had the greatest impact on the
effecting of business relationships between the parties of transatlantic
cooperative efforts. The problems created for the U.S. Government and
industry will be identified in the following sections.
C. IMPACT ON THE ACQUISITION MANAGER
The use of foreign procurement regulations (primarily pricing and
audit) has a significant impact on the acquisition manager. To date,
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only foreign procurement regulations, modified to include required U.S.
statutory contractual provisions, have been utilized in a limited number
of programs but the problems that can be experienced are apparent.
The acquisition manager already must contend with the difficult
interpretation and application of complex Defense Acquisition Regulations
(DAR)
.
When foreign regulations are interjected, the process is made
even more complex. In the programs where modified foreign regulations
have been used, acquisition managers have indicated they do not have a
thorough understanding of foreign procurement regulations. This contri-
buted to the difficulty of effecting a business relationship between the
parties of the programs.
Many times the first problem encountered by the acquisition manager
is obtaining an English translation of the foreign regulations so they
can be compared to the DAR. Even if this is possible or has already been
accomplished, the possibility still exists for differences in inter-
pretation due to semantics.
The acquisition manager then is faced with obtaining a thorough
knowledge of a procurement system and regulations based on traditional
values which have evolved from a totally different environment. A
compromise between these regulations and U.S. procurement regulations,
at best, is difficult.
In contracts that involve both U.S. and foreign competing sources,
the acquisition manager is responsible for determining that the source
selected is the most competitive, price and other factors considered.
When foreign procurement regulations are utilized, even in a modified
form, this process becomes more complicated. When two sets of
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procurement regulations are being applied, it is difficult to determine if
fair and equal competition exists because the competing contractors are
not subject to the same restrictive provisions. One contractor may be
required to bear a number of costs not required of the other contractor,
providing the other contractor with an unfair advantage.
Even more difficult is the determination of a fair and reasonable
price. DOD pricing policy, as to foreign contracts and subcontracts,
states: [13:2]
It is a prerequisite to entering into any contract for the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) that the cognizant contracting officer (CO)
make a finding that the price to be paid for the property or ser-
vices to be purchased is reasonable.
There are basically two problems in this area. The first problem is
obtaining the cost and pricing data in the proper format required. Under
foreign pricing regulations, there are many differences in the accounting
systems for accumulating costs as well as major differnces in cost allow-
ability and allocability. Foreign countries are reluctant to change
their traditional accounting methods in order to break out costs differ-
ently to meet U.S. requirements. Even when this is done, there is con-
siderable doubt as to the validity of the cost and pricing data because
many costs cannot be broken out successfully by the foreign country.
Seldom is all required cost and pricing data provided initially.
Usually several requests for specific items of data are necessary to
obtain enough data so that adequate pricing can be performed.
The second problem is that a foreign country's auditors acting as
representatives of the U.S. in providing pricing support often are in-
experienced in U.S. requirements and incapable of providing the pricing
56

support normally expected of U.S. auditors. While the acquisition
manager can request support in these instances from the U.S. Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in the foreign country, this creates the
additional burden of having to evaluate the foreign country's accounting
system and audit capability to determine if this is required.
When foreign procurement regulations are utilized, the acquisition
manager can experience problems concerning contract flow-down provisions.
This occurs when a U.S. prime contractor is subcontracting with foreign
industry. The U.S. Government flows-down contractual provisions applic-
able to prime contractors to the prime's subcontractors. These flow-
down provisions ensure that U.S. Government objectives and cost controls
are met by the subcontractor and monitored by the prime contractor.
When foreign procurement regulations are utilized by the foreign sub-
contractors, certain U.S. flow-down provisions cannot be applied directly,
For example, a flow-down clause in every contract is audited by the De-
partment of Defense. When a foreign country's auditors act as representa-
tives of the U.S., direct access to the records of the foreign sub-
contractor is not available to the prime except through the foreign
auditors. If costs are not controlled, this provides an avenue for the
prime to make a case for not being held accountable by the U.S. Govern-
ment. Since the prime could not audit or gain access to the sub-
contractor's records, the prime could claim the controls were not
actually available for monitoring the subcontractor.
These problems all contribute to greater complexity in contract
evaluation and administration. This only tends to increase procure-
ment lead time and contract costs.
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These are a few of the problems that can impact the acquisition
manager when foreign procurement regulations are used in contracting.
Many other problems may develop if these regulations are applied in
total without any modification for required U.S. procurement
provisions.
D. IMPACT ON U.S. INDUSTRY
The impact of using foreign procurement regulations does not only
affect the acquisition manager but U.S. industry as well. U.S. industry
also must deal with the problem of interpreting complex procurement
regulations when foreign regulations are interjected into a program along
with the DAR. Obtaining a translation of the regulations into English
and the differences created by semantics are again complications. The
general consensus of several U.S. industry personnel involved in a multi-
national cooperative effort is that U.S. industry does not have a de-
tailed understanding of foreign procurement regulations, but understands
them well enough to enter into a business relationship with foreign
countries.
What is considered to be a greater difficulty by industry is obtain-
ing the support from the U.S. Government in establishing these business
relationships. When the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a co-
operative effort is negotiated between governments and issues involving
the use of foreign procurement regulations are not resolved even though
the MOU is signed, the burden of resolving these issues falls on industry.
U.S. industry personnel have indicated that, without cooperation of the
governments involved, U.S. industry cannot resolve these issues with
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foreign industry and therefore encounters problems in establishing a
business relationship. U.S. industry's view is that participation in
the MOU negotiating process, if only as an advisor, would prevent MOU's
that cannot be performed contractually from being negotiated. Once an
MOU is negotiated and signed and a prime U.S. contractor is required
contractually to carry out the provisions of the MOU, obtaining U.S.
Government support to resolve issues that should have been resolved when
the MOU was negotiated is a time consuming process. The prime U.S. con-
tractor operating under a contract with real cost and schedule require-
ments is not in the position to resolve these issues. The administrative
burden alone is prohibitive.
The actual contractual provisions U.S. industry has experienced the
greatest difficulty with in using foreign procurement regulations when
contracting with foreign countries are the pricing and audit provisions.
The first problem involved with using foreign pricing provisions is ob-
taining all the cost and pricing data necessary to adequately price out
a contract. Foreign industries are not required to give their govern-
ments the volume of data required of U.S. industry. So, even though
U.S. industry requests the full amount of cost and pricing data required
on a DD-633, what is received initially is not adequate. U.S. industry
has to request several times specific items of data before enough informa-
tion is received to adequately price out the contract. Also, foreign
industry may be reluctant to provide the data because of the European
view of a fair price as being whatever the market will bear or because
their accounting system does not accumulate the cost data in the format
required. All in all, the result is considerable delay.
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The second problem concerns the validity of the cost and pricing
data received. Many costs are buried in more than one area and again
foreign accounting systems may not be capable of breaking these costs
out accurately. When the differences between U.S. and foreign regula-
tions concerning allowability and allocability are included, U.S. in-
dustry is faced with an even greater problem in identifying valid cost
and pricing data.
These problems create considerable delay in obtaining complete and
accurate pricing data from foreign industry and cause U.S. contractors,
who are competing for a prime contract, to obtain subcontract pricing
data from only U.S. sources to support their proposals even though
foreign sources will be involved. This may result in additional costs
being incurred which have to be paid by the U.S. contractors.
Finally, the increased use of foreign procurement regulations tends
to create a more lenient situation for foreign industry than U.S. in-
dustry. As the U.S. has gradually modified its procurement regulations,
European countries have not done the same. This has resulted in greater
restrictions being placed on U.S. industry. If this continues, U.S.
industry will not be able to compete fairly and equally with foreign
industry for U.S. contracts. The U.S. Treasury has already expressed
this concern by stating: [14:22]
Any modification of certain laws and procurement regulations
to reduce friction caused by U.S. regulations could create a
more lenient situation for foreign producers than for domestic
producers. We agree that such a situation should not develop
and that any modification of U.S. regulations be made only if
equivalent actions are undertaken by foreign countries toward




Cooperative efforts with the NATO European nations are desired but
only if these efforts can be met while maintaining the basic premise of
the U.S. procurement system, which is fair and equal competition.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD
The problems encountered by the acquisition manager and U.S. industry
in the use of foreign procurement regulations have significant implica-
tions for the Department of Defense (DOD) . If DOD continues to modify
U.S. procurement regulations to accommodate foreign countries, it will
have to operate under two systems: the present competitive U.S. sys-
tem and a unique non-competitive system for contracting with foreign
countries. As stated in previous sections, this is because the re-
strictions placed on U.S. industry by U.S. procurement regulations will
not apply to foreign industries. The basic premise of U.S. procure-
ment, fair and equal competition, will be violated as well, and U.S.
industry will be placed at a disadvantage which could result in a sub-
stantial economic impact.
U.S. acquisition personnel will have to become knowledgeable in the
business, legal, and policy differences of every foreign country since
each is different and business relationships will have to be tailored
to the regulations of the countries involved. Training will be a time
consuming and costly process. Also, an initial shortage of qualified
personnel will be experienced.
The complexity of business relationships will make contract evalua-
tion and administration more difficult and costly. Procurement control
will be difficult to maintain.
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Further, significant modification of U.S. defense acquisition regula-
tions to accommodate foreign procurement systems will only set a
precedent for continued modification of other defense acquisition regula-
tions. Justification for not modifying DAR provisions will become more
difficult for the U.S.
Finally, the increased complexity of accomplishing cooperative efforts
will lengthen the procurement lead time, making these efforts more costly.
This may discourage future participation by the U.S. in cooperative pro-
grams since an overall goal is cost savings for the U.S. as well as NATO.
Many of the problems identified in this chapter which hold implications
such as these for DOD are illustrated in present and ongoing programs.
One such program will be reviewed in the next chapter.
62

V. EXPERIENCES WITH THE ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE (RAM) PROGRAM
A. GENERAL
The application of foreign procurement regulations has been on a
case-by-case basis and to a limited number of programs. U.S. /European
multinational programs have been affected by the waiver of U.S. Defense
Acquisition Regulations (DAR) deemed not applicable to foreign countries
but few U.S. involved programs have then allowed the application of
foreign procurement regulations in place of U.S. provisions. The Roll-
ing Airframe Missile (RAM) program is such a case and therefore is an
excellent example of the problems encountered in the use of foreign pro-
curement regulations.
B. RAM PROGRAM AGREEMENT
The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) program is a codevelopment/co-
production of an advanced surface-to-air missile system. On 22 July 1976,
the United States (U.S.) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became
participating governments under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for
the cooperative development phase of the program. The intent of the
governments was and is to proceed in two phases for the development: co-
operative development (the current MOU) and full-scale engineering
development (FSED)
.
With the cooperative development nearly completed at the end of 1978,
both governments and Denmark (DK) , as a new participating government,
desired to enter into an MOU for the purpose of conducting the FSED phase
of the development. It was also the intent of all parties that General
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Dynamics (GD) , Pomona Division, be the prime contractor for this effort,
that some of the work be subcontracted to one or more FRG firms, but that
no work be subcontracted to DK industry.
The U.S. Navy informed GD that the MOU and prime contract would contain
a provision that encouraged the prime contractor for the FSED phase to
solicit sources in the FRG. Therefore, with this verbal indication, GD
proceeded to solicit sources in the FRG using standard procurement method-
ology with the exception that U.S. Government concurrence with the selec-
tion of a subcontractor would be received prior to announcing the winner
of the competition. GD had already solicited U.S. sources in order to
substantiate the prime contract proposal presently being negotiated.
However, GD decided that the most competitive U.S. /FRG source, price and
all other factors considered, would be selected as the winner of the com-
petition. As stated, there was no MOU or prime contract at this point;
both were being negotiated.
In reviewing plans with government agencies and briefing prospective
suppliers, GD continually stressed the intended use of contract terms
and conditions consistent with U.S. Government procurement regulations.
Every time GD met with prospective FRG suppliers, GD was informed that
the use of FRG procurement regulations (particularly audit and pricing
regulations) was required for FRG sources though U.S. provisions had
been used in the past. The German firms contacted by GD cited their
own regulations (Verordnung uel er Preise bei Deffenilichen Auftraegan,
Regulations on Pricing in Public Contracts, and the Leitsatze fur
Preisermittlung Aufgrund von Selbstkosten, Rules for the Determination
of Cost Pricing) as more appropriate than the cited U.S. clauses
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(DAR Clause 7-104.41, Audit by Department of Defense, and DAR Clause
7-104. 42 (a), Subcontracting Cost or Pricing Data). In the briefings to
both governments and the RAM program international steering committee, GD
advised that problems were being experienced in these areas and were pro-
hibiting GD from effecting a business relationship with FRG industry. GD
requested that relief be provided in the MOU and prime contract.
When the MOU was signed in March 1979 and the prime contract awarded
in June 1979, neither document contained the relief GD required. However,
the Navy contract did contain specific language concerning subcontracting
in the FRG and the flow-down of U.S. contracting provisions to FRG sub-
contracts. The contract specified concerning subcontracting in the FRG:
The contractor shall award subcontracts to industry in the Federal
Republic of Germany if it is determined that industry in the
Federal Republic of Germany is the most competitive source con-
sidering all factors such as the technical and management capabili-
ties of the sources, the schedule implications and the cost to the
program. Notwithstanding any provisions of the subcontracts clause
to the contrary, the contractor shall not enter into subcontracts
with industry from the Federal Republic of Germany without the prior
written consent of the contracting officer.
The contract further provides for the flow-down of the terms and pro-
visions of the prime contract to any potential FRG subcontracts. It
states
:
The contract contemplates the exercise of the contractor's best
efforts to obtain the inclusion in FRG subcontract (s) of pro-
visions of this contract required by the terms of this contract
to be so included hereinafter referred to as flow-down provisions.
In the event of refusal by a subcontractor to accept these flow-
down provisions, the contractor:
(1) shall promptly submit a written report to the pro-
curing contracting officer setting forth the sub-
contractor's reason for such refusal and other
pertinent information which may expedite disposition
of the matter; and
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(2) shall not proceed with award of subcontract
without the written authorization of the pro-
curing contracting officer.
Any subcontractor flow-down requirements shall be subject to the
right of the procuring contracting officer, at his own instance
or upon request of the contractor, whether to modify or to waive
in writing such flow-down requirements whenever he determines
that he is not legally compelled to maintain such requirements,
and when the respective modification or waivers, in his judgment,
are in the interest of the government.
These clauses resulted from the MOU between participating governments for
the cooperative FSED phase of the program.
After further attempts to persuade FRG sources to accept U.S. contract
clauses on pricing and audit were unsuccessful, GD requested relief from
passing these provisions on to FRG subcontractors. At this point, GD was
operating under a prime contract with real performance, schedule, fund-
ing and legal constraints and a number of FRG firms that had been selected
on the basis of competition to perform in some areas but with which GD
could not effect a business relationship. GD had to subcontract with
someone to meet the prime contract obligations and if the issues of pric-
ing and audit could not be resolved in a timely manner, it would not be
FRG industry.
The contracting officer determined, based on GD's efforts, that FRG
sources would not accept subcontracts with U.S. DAR audit and pricing
provisions. Action was taken to request waivers that would exempt FRG
sources on the RAM program from the requirements of audit by DOD and sub-
contractor cost or pricing data clauses. A waiver of these clauses would




The request for waiver was forwarded from the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) via the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) to the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) . The
request was rejected at the ASN (M, RA£L) level on the basis that al-
ternative U.S. sources existed and the request could not be fully
justified. The burden was placed on GD to work out the differences
with FRG subcontractors.
GD once again commenced discussions with FRG sources in an attempt
to resolve the issue. These discussions led GD to discover the minutes
of a meeting between the U.S. Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB)
and the FRG government, dated June 1978, wherein the CASB addressed
issues such as allowability and unallowability of costs under DAR
versus VOPR. The Discussions also led to the discovery of an umbrella
MOU between the U.S. and FRG governments addressing audits and audit
agencies. These minutes and MOU were taken to be firm agreements by
the FRG government. On the other hand, not all levels of the U.S.
Government recognized these documents as such.
The agreements provided that for subcontracts awarded to FRG in-
dustry, U.S. cost accounting standards would be substituted by German
pricing regulations (VOPR) and audits would be performed by the FRG
Federal Office of Military Technology and Procurement (BWB) . As a
result of GD's discussion with the FRG Government and industry, a special
provision which reflected aspects of the meeting held between the U.S.
CASB and the FRG Government was drafted with their assistance for in-
clusion in the prime and each subcontract. The special provision
covered both accounting principles and audit procedures. This special
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provision was finally approved by the FRG Ministry of Defense and the
U.S. Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering).
The result of the agreement was a compromise between U.S. and FRG
procurement regulations. The special provision developed is as follows
It is the understanding between the parties that the Governments
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are
planning to arrange for updating existing agreements between the
governments regarding the application of national pricing rules
and regulations and audit practices used in acquisitions involv-
ing the two governments. Until such time as an updated agreement
is reached and implemented by the two governments the following
shall apply to this subcontract only:
A. Accounting Principles
The seller shall utilize the cost principles set forth
in the VOPR 30/53 including the Leitsatze fur
Preisermittlung Aufgrund von Selbstkosten (LSP)
(appendix to the VOPR 30/53).
It is agreed, that the following costs unallowable




-- Losses on other contracts
-- Cost of organization and reorganization
-- Uneconomical leasing and rental cost
-- Product-related advertising expenses
-- Expenses for recreation, entertainment,
and the like
-- Interest and other financial costs
-- Plant reconversion as agreed by purchase order
-- Uneconomical relocation
The following costs allowable under the provisions of
VOPR 30/53 but unallowable under DAR Section XV will be
subject to negotiations between the parties to the sub-
contracts in order to comply with DAR Section XV
unallowables:
-- Advertising costs (to the extent unallowable by
U.S. statutes)
-- Contributions and donations




-- Depreciation on the basis of replacement costs
-- Independent research and development, if applicable
(to the extent unallowable by U.S. statutes)
(If the contractor customarily uses the replacement cost
to determine depreciation costs, the contract cost will
be computed as if depreciation had been based on the actual
acquisition cost. The invested capital on which the cal-
culation of the imputed interest is based will be adjusted
in the same manner. These adjustments may be effected in
the form of lump sum adjustments.)
It is understood and agreed that application of the German
pricing regulations to U.S. contracts does not prejudice
questions concerning the rate of profit or fee to be
earned under this subcontract. It is recognized that the
rate of profit or fee or amount of profit or fee will
remain subject to the negotiations by the contract parties
concerned and that deviations from the German pricing
regulations (items of cost which are deemed unallowable
under DAR) will be taken into account in negotiating the
rates of profit or fee for this subcontract.
B. Designation of Audit Agency
With the exception of clause entitled examination of records
by Comptroller General, the Federal Office of Military
Technology and Procurement (BWB) in the Federal Republic
of Germany has been authorized as the representative of
the U.S. Government and buyer as set forth in the clause,
Audit by the Department of Defense, and any provisions of
this subcontract expressly or by reasonable implication
contemplating access to records of the seller, for conduct-
ing proposal price and cost reviews, actual cost audits
and audits to determine allowability of costs in accordance
with the principles set forth in A. above entitled "Account-
ing Principles," of subcontracts at any tier within the
Federal Republic of Germany under the RAM Contract
N00024-79-C-5202.
In the event the prime contract is modified to reflect
agreements reached between the two governments, then the
parties shall agree to enter into negotiation in good
faith to modify this subcontract.
This special provision allowed GD and FRG industry to effect a busi-
ness relationship. The agreement resulting in this provision was
reached at the last possible moment. GD could not negotiate with FRG
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industry any longer and would have had no alternative but to revert to
U.S. sources. This provision allowed contracts for RAM to be awarded
to FRG industry in August 1979.
This brief overview of the RAM program illustrates only a few of
the problems for the acquisition manager and U.S. industry which result
from the use of foreign procurement regulations and how these prob-
lems were approached in a specific program. As identified in Chapter IV,
there are many more problems which result from their use.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. As identified in the research, the U.S. and European procure-
ment systems have evolved from different environments. The Europeans
have essentially a non-competitive system with close relationships be-
tween government and industry. On the other hand, the U.S. system has
competition as its basic premise and belief in maintaining an arms-
length relationship between government and industry. Any attempt to
arrive at a compromise by modifying the regulations of both procure-
ment systems will almost certainly be unsuccessful.
The modification of U.S. and FRG procurement regulations which
occurred in the RAM program was successful only because the statutory
provisions of the U.S. procurement system were not waived. This clear-
ly left U.S. regulations dominating the procurement and therefore the
existence of a competitive system for source selection. As a result, a
true compromise between U.S. and FRG regulations was not achieved. How-
ever, what did become apparent were the many problems that will be en-
countered in trying to manage a program operating with the modified
regulations of two different procurement systems.
While certain regulations which are not applicable to doing busi-
ness with foreign countries should be waived permanently, the U.S.
cannot afford to waive those provisions founded on statutory require-
ments which form the basis of its procurement system. If this ever




2. Memoranda of understanding are important agreements which must
specifically address the application of procurement laws and regulations
which affect acquisitions under the MOU. These issues must be resolved
by the participating governments and not left to U.S. industry for
resolution once the provisions of the MOU have become contractual
clauses.
3. Acquisition personnel in both the U.S. Government and industry
do not have a thorough understanding of foreign procurement regulations.
However, the general consensus is these personnel understand them well
enough to effect business relationships with foreign countries. There
is room for speculation as to the validity of this statement. Even if
this is true, it will be difficult to obtain a working knowledge suf-
ficient to successfully contract using each European country's variation
in regulations.
4. Obtaining cost and pricing data from foreign sources is a time
consuming process under U.S. cost and pricing regulations and the
validity of such data cannot always be assured. When foreign cost and
pricing regulations are used, the process becomes even more complex be-
cause agreements with each foreign country have to be reached concern-
ing the allowability and allocability of costs. Failure to reach an
agreement which protects the competitive procurement process may result
in foreign industry attaining a significant advantage over U.S. industry.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Direct contracting between the U.S. and European countries should
not be accomplished by modifying U.S. and European regulations with the
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exception of waiving on a permanent basis those procurement regulations
not applicable to international acquisition. The procurement regula-
tions of the contracting country which has been designated the sponsor-
ing country or prime contractor for the multinational acquisition should
be utilized. This ensures that the sponsoring government and prime
contractor responsible for managing the program have to deal with only
one set of procurement regulations of which they have a thorough under-
standing. The U.S. should be prepared to utilize the procurement
regulations of the European country that has been designated the spon-
soring country and prime contractor.
This contracting policy is not completely problem free. Accounting
systems may have to be modified to account for and break out costs in
the format required by another country but this will be far less diffi-
cult to accomplish than the modifying of various procurement systems on
a country-by-country basis.
2. General MOU's should specifically address the issue of procure-
ment regulations and procedures that will be used. U.S. procurement
regulations not applicable to international acquisition should be
waived on a permanent basis and stated in the general MOU with each
European country. Obtaining waivers for these provisions on a recurring
basis is time consuming as well as an unnecessary administrative burden
on the acquisition manager and industry.
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
The NATO Explosion Resistant Multi Influence Sweep System (ERMISS)
program involves contracting in accordance with procurement regulations
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of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) . The FRG is the sponsoring
country and prime contractor and will place subcontracts for elements
of the program with European and U.S. industries. B.F. Goodrich is one
such U.S. industry.
The contracting policy utilized in the ERMISS program is a model
for what should be the preferred method of direct contracting in co-
operative efforts. A case study of the ERMISS program could be per-
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